Working under the hook

The magic word is 'practical.' It is physically possible to avoid overhead loads, but the costs and logistics would be totally impractical. We all know that safety comes before costs. All deliveries could be swung across the site before the main workforce arrived, or after their departure. Shutters could be stacked horizontally, almost in position, in the early morning and then lifted and placed during the day. All personnel could be instructed to down tools and move away every time a load approached. Exclusion zones could keep the public well away from moving crane jibs.

This is wonderful on paper, but not at all practical. Where would we find the space to store materials? Would we always be allowed to start really early (without disturbing the neighbours) and work late (without running crane operators into overtime)?

At the planning stage, someone would have to calculate the cost of stopping everyone else while cranes work. Operatives on bonus or sub contractors on fixed price would never stop and move away unless they were reimbursed. The concrete gang, usually on a scaffold with nowhere to run, need to be very near or below a skip as it travels towards the pour. The chippy [carpenter] needs to be hands-on as he guides a suspended shutter between the scaffold and the wall.

Okay, so it should be the slinger's job. But have you ever seen a lone slinger struggling with a big shutter? If we insisted that the chippy move, the falling shutter would miss him by one inch, assuming that it would come down in a straight line.

The public, hurrying to work or to the shops, would not tolerate exclusion zones every few hundred yards as they walked through city centres. All the same, we erect crash decks and fans, we put out bunting tape and a few cones, but we don't physically stop people from being close to overhead crane jibs or suspended loads. We can instruct crane operators to keep within specified areas, but, for example, a tower crane operator with a saddle jib crane or a luffer can be half a metre out too far and be past the crash deck and over the public. An exclusion zone below the full length of the jib would solve the problem, but bring the city to a standstill.

Short of this suggestion, there is lots we can do. There is lots that we have done.

What can be done

At the planning stage we should ensure that delivery and off-loading areas are positioned away from main site work. Offices, welfare cabins and pedestrian access could be outside the crane jib radius. A co-ordinator could plan the sequence of work to avoid or minimise overhead loads. One could use concrete pumps to avoid crane skips. One could position fabrication yards (steel, timber, concrete) close to access/transport roads. Site access roads could be segregated from the public, and not over-sailed by the crane jib. Careful consideration of crane type-luffer or saddle-jib, tower or mobile-also makes a difference.

Safety at Terminal 5

At T5 we used SMIE anticollision systems, which were fitted to all cranes that oversailed offices, welfare cabins and pedestrian routes. As with most sites, oversailing was unavoidable. But the SMIE system allowed cranes to pass over all areas, but restricted the trolley motion from specific areas. Such areas included public highways and aircraft stands. The cranes could work right up to these areas, but not beyond fence lines.

We employed qualified crane supervisors (with a maximum of four cranes each) to direct and monitor crane movements on every section of the project. This stopped unnecessary random lifts, particularly over personnel. Priority of movement was given to crawler and mobile cranes, because they could not see the tower crane operator as well as he could see them. This in itself proved to be a great help in minimising lifts. Trades foremen who realised that they would be wasting their time shouting for cranes every five minutes planned their jobs better and organised only essential lifts. We used whistles to warn operatives of approaching loads.

When the philosophy of IIF (incident and injury free) was introduced we adopted the 'don't walk by' approach. As a result, operatives became more aware of the dangers associated with cranage and were aware that if they did not protect themselves, someone would soon point out the error of their ways.

Supervisors, particularly crane supervisors, were always conscious of the fact that they couldn't put anyone to work in an unsafe manner. With so many lifting operations going on there were an awful lot of people to consider and an equal number of people who knew right from wrong. There was a written procedure for dealing with one contractor's crane working over another contractor's workforce. According to this procedure, loads did not go over their heads and management decided whose crane had priority. It was inevitable that contractors would use their own cranes over their own workforce.

To do everything that was practicable, in addition to the whistles, shouting, re-routing loads and SMIE, we devised a Bible, The T5 Lifting Practice. Every type of proposed lift was photographed and illustrated with a written description of which lifting gear to use and how to use it. If a lift was not in the Bible, it didn't get done until the appointed person had approved it in writing.

There were other policies as well. All crane and plant operators and slinger/signallers underwent a safety-critical medical examination at induction. Slingers attended assessment sessions and seminars to ensure they were suited to the cranes and familiar with the recommended slinging techniques. Weekly crane team meetings and monthly appointed persons' forums were designed to pool ideas and information to lessen the chance of incidents. These meetings were also a means of coordinating crane and load movements to avoid overhead operations wherever possible.

Men working in trenches were required to move out and away from loads delivered by excavators. Slingers walking alongside a forklift truck with a suspended load were required to use a tag line and not touch or be near the load. Crane suppliers inspected at three-monthly intervals, from awareness of the requisite 12-monthly, or possibly 6-monthly inspections [for equipment that lifts people]. Most cranes were brand new anyway. Vacuum/sucker devices were backed up by a secondary sling to double the safety factor.

Nobody plans an accident, almost everybody plans to avoid one. But when it happens there is usually glaring evidence that the plan didn't cover the likelihood, or was not adhered to.

People will always stand and/or walk beneath loads for a variety of reasons, usually money, or they know and trust the operator (bravado). They have to be educated. It's not big or clever. But it will reduce compensation claims. Management has to stop them being there, has to allow for the downtime costs, has to bite the bullet and tell the client why the tender price seems high, or is higher than the competition.

The client has to appreciate that a site closed for investigation is no use to anyone. A few minutes saved here and there by taking risks can so easily turn into days or weeks lost.

Safety regulators must specify exactly what they require of us, with no ambiguity. We already have rules like "Thou shalt wear a safety harness in a boom-type work platform," and we accept that we will wear one, not only if we feel like it or if there happens to be one handy.

There is no easy solution. If there were it wouldn't suit everyone. But easy or hard, it is solutions we need. Consider this: if the man in the wig [an English judge] asked you for a simple explanation why you allowed the load to go over a man's head and why you allowed him to stand there, what would you say?